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INTRODUCTION
That the United States Constitution establishes a single executive is incontrovertible as a
historical matter;1 a plural executive was debated and rejected.2 As a matter of constitutional
theory and institutional design, however, this conclusion is far from inevitable and likely
incorrect. The convention era debates about single versus plural executives exhibited
fundamental confusion about the relationship between numerosity in the executive, the structure
of executive authority, and core democratic values like accountability, coordination, and
uniformity. This confusion is understandable given the extraordinary pedigree of single
executives in constitutional theory, including, but not limited to Locke,3 Blackstone,4 Hamilton,5
and Montesquieu,6 and the historical fact that most plural executive regimes were ineffectual
councils. But the conventional justifications for rejecting plural executives are powerful weapons
against only some very specific forms of plural executive regimes. Unfortunately, this early
confusion has been replicated over and over in more recent debates about the unitary executive
and the scope of executive authority.
This Article articulates and analyzes the possibility of what we call the unbundled
executive. The unbundled executive is a plural executive regime in which discrete authority is
taken from the President and given exclusively to a directly elected executive official. Imagine a
directly elected War Executive, Education Executive or Agriculture Executive. We show that a
partially unbundled executive is likely to perform better than the completely bundled executive
structure attendant in the single executive regime. By better, we mean that the standard
arguments used to justify a single strong unitary executive in the United States —accountability,
energy, uniformity, coordination, and so on—actually justify a specific type of plural executive,
not the single executive structure favored in Article II. Our thesis then is both unusual and
controversial in that there has been virtually no serious theoretical challenge to the single
executive structure for more than a century. The entire unitary executive debate assumes a
cornerstone that we suggest is incorrect and consequential.

1

U.S. Const. art I, sec. 1 (“the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the Unites States of
America”).
2

For example, Eldridge Gerry favored annexing a Council to the Executive. In general, participants in the
Federal Convention were concerned that a single executive would trend towards monarchy on the one hand, but that
a plural executive would lack sufficient energy and authority on the other. See generally 3 THE FOUNDERS
CONSTITUTION 491-95 (PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, EDS.) (collecting statements of convention members
regarding single and plural executives).
3

J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 144 (J. Gough ed.1947) (arguing that not only
should there only one executive but also a perpetual; Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, in Essays on the Constitution
161, 163 (P. Ford ed. 1892) (“supreme executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he
is to execute”);
4

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 242-43 (need for single Executive).

5

The Federalist 254 (No. 70 Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (energy in single executive critical for
security and steady implementation of laws).
6

See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 163 (J.V. Prichard ed. & Thomas Nugent trans.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748).

2008

The Unbundled Executive

2

The unbundled executive proposal has an air of absurdity to it with respect to federal law,
but this basic structure is an existing feature of legions of state and local governments in the
United States. Most states directly elect state attorneys general—as well as numerous other
executive officers—and dividing executive authority does not usually produce any of the
pathologies that critics of divided executives suggest.7 Prohibiting an executive from appointing
cabinet members connotes a debilitating lack of coordination and efficiency. Yet, most state and
local governments, whatever their faults, do not appear to be debilitated in this way. In reality,
the closest empirical approximations to the unbundled executive in state and local governments
seem to produce systematic shifts in public policy outcomes towards public preferences.8
Unbundling executive authority enhances democratic accountability and government
performance; the plural executive regime does not cease to function.
This empirical regularity that unbundled executives produce political outcomes closer to
public preferences has a natural and intuitive foundation in legal theory. An unbundled executive
systematically reduces agency problems in representative government by enhancing
accountability to national citizen constituencies. Unbundling executive authority reduces the risk
of non-uniform implementation of federal law. And the unbundled executive would be as
energetic and strong as a bundled executive. Put simply, the unbundled executive performs better
along the very dimensions that are typically used to justify the single, strong, unitary executive
structure that Article II articulates;9 that is, the unbundled executive outperforms the single
unitary executive on its own turf.
Unbundling government authority does, however, also generate concrete costs, which we
identify and discuss. We show how and why there can be too much unbundling of government
authority. These costs, however, must be traded off against the gains in executive performance
that our system would generate. While we think it implausible that executive authority should be
entirely unbundled such that hundreds of executives would be directly elected, it is nearly as
implausible that a single perfectly bundled executive represents the optimal executive structure.
Given that this is, in fact, the current regime, some rethinking of executive authority is surely in
order.
Modern legal theory is replete with detailed and careful analysis of the costs and benefits
of centralizing or fragmenting authority across branches. The dispersion of power among the
branches of government is a key organizing principle sounded loudly in the Federalist papers,10

7

Id. See also William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives? Some New
Data Concerning State Attorneys General, 8 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 17 (1974). See also William P. Marshall,
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE
L.J. 2446 (2006) (discussing interaction between elected attorneys generals and governors). Marshall’s work is
probably the closest to our own.
8

See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
(unpublished manuscript 2008) (showing that jurisdictions with more directly elected governmental officials
produce policies more in keeping with voter preferences).
9

See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
10

See, e.g., Federalist 48 (“An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which
should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being
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that also echoes throughout more modern and more ancient constitutional theory.11 There is,
however, a comparative dearth of scholarship analyzing the internal allocation of authority
within branches.12 This is unfortunate given that the internal structure of power within branches
is likely to produce impacts on democratic governance that are at least as severe as cross-branch
distributions.
To the extent that this theoretical space has been filled at all in recent years, it has been
largely the unitary executive debate that occupied this terrain.13 Many pages in the law reviews
and Supreme Court reporters have been filled with fights over what the Constitution permits and
requires on this front;14 must the President have strong, weak, or complete hierarchical control
over all administrative officials?15 What is the permissible structure that Congress may establish
for relations between the President and administrative officials?16 May Congress restrict the
effectually checked and restrained by the others.”). See also DAVID EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY
FEDERALIST (1984).

OF THE

11

Compare 1 Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 163 (J.V. Prichard ed. & Thomas Nugent trans.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748) (“There would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”) with Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle
of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 236 (“The substantive interpretation of the constitutional principle
of separation of powers would reduce to a single, simple rule: Congress may not create a Fourth Branch of the
federal government.”).
12

This idea is related to, but also distinct from, recent work emphasizing internal separation of powers as
an organizing principle for the executive. See Neil Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (arguing that separation of authority within executive
departments could provide a check on the aggrandizement of arbitrary executive power). There is, of course, no
shortage of work on the importance bicameralism in this regard. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are
Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INTL. REV. L & ECON. 145 (1992) (clarifying conditions under which multiple
decisions produce superior outcomes in the legislature). See also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (2002).
13

See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in
the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). See also
note 16.
14

See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710-11 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
15

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
16

Roughly speaking, this debate has two fault lines, historical and normative. Historically, there is
disagreement about whether the founders intended a strong unitary executive. Compare Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2
(1994). In addition to the historical question, there is a separate normative question about whether a strong unitary
executive is desirable on consequentionalist grounds. Compare Lessig & Sunstein (desirable), with Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (undesirable). For variants of the argument that
Article II’s vesting clause settles question of plural versus single executive, but not strong versus weak hierarchical
control, see Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and
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President’s ability to remove an officer appointed by the President? Does the President have the
authority to negate the judgments of any and all administrative officials?17 Could the President
unilaterally substitute her own judgment for that of any administrative official?18
On one view, independent agencies—those headed by officials who cannot be removed
by the President without good cause—are legally uncontroversial; on the other, they are an
abomination clearly inconsistent with the explicit constitutional structure.19 This is a good and
important debate as far as it goes; but as a matter of constitutional possibility, it is meager.
Constitutional theory can be a bit more ambitious.
In the remainder of the paper, we articulate and defend our theory of the unbundled
executive. We survey the theoretical debates about structuring executive authority and show how
and why the unbundled executive performs better than a single unitary executive. Although our
discussion is mainly conceptual, we draw on empirical evidence about how unbundled authority
affects public policy whenever relevant. We clarify the relation between the unbundled executive
and both current and historical debates in constitutional law. We also revisit the relevant debates
about plural executive structures. Our work can, but need not, be read as an attack on many of
the pragmatic justifications for a strong unitary executive. As such, the work is directly relevant
to ongoing disputes about whether article II should be interpreted to require a unitary executive
structure in addition to a single executive structure. These questions of numerosity and
unitariness have been treated almost identically in the literature; in reality, they are conceptually
distinct.
To be clear at the outset, we are adamantly not arguing that the U.S. Constitution does, in
fact, establish a plural unbundled executive regime. But the sky might not fall if it did. Systems
of plural or divided executives have long been ridiculed in constitutional theory. If our
unbundling story is even plausible, there are a significant set of unappreciated benefits to some
variants of plural executive regimes. Although we estimate the probability of institutional reform
in the United States to be approximately zero, it would not be nearly as perverse as it first
appears to design an unbundled executive. If so, taking steps within the given constitutional
order to bring executive authority closer to the unbundled executive ideal could make for a better
fit between institutional performance and constitutional values.
I. UNBUNDLING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
This Part provides a general conceptual overview of the unbundled executive. We explain
the dynamics of unbundling authority in government, emphasizing the ways in which unbundled
Fall of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1989); Bruce
Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Executive the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979); E. Donald
Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989).
17

See, e.g., Kevin Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
263 (2006).
18

See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963

(2001).
19

See generally Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 123 (1994) (arguing growth of national government makes arguments for strongly unitary executive less
powerful).
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authority often enhances democratic accountability. We then provide some empirical
institutional details about the extent of executive unbundling in state and local governments.
Although our goals in this paper are mainly conceptual rather than empirical, unbundled
authority is consistently associated with meaningful differences in policy outcomes in state and
local government. The degree of unbundling in government matters not just in theory, but also in
practice.
A. The Unbundled Executive in Theory
One of the obvious defining features of the U.S. Presidency is the national electoral
constituency.20 The institutional design choice to make the President directly elected rather than
selected by the legislature largely distinguishes the Presidential system from the parliamentary
system.21 Direct electoral accountability to a national constituency is critical.22 Indeed, elections
are often said to be the cornerstone of constitutional democracy.23
Of course, any idealized view of elections as translating popular preferences into public
policy has long-since faltered.24 Voter ignorance or information asymmetries often undermine
the use of elections to control officials.25 The very notion of popular will to be translated into
policy by officials is either incoherent26 or nonexistent.27 Public choice theory suggests a
plethora of reasons to be dubious of most facets of the political process, including elections.28
20

See Jide Nzelbe, TheFable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1217 (2006) (arguing framers did not think the President would better represent nationalist interests than the
Congress); James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 47, 64 (1979) (describing the
framers' vision of executive power.
21

See Alan Siaroff, Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 24 Int’l Pol.
Sci. Rev. 445 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000) (contrasting
presidentialism with constrained parliamentarianism); Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks
and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, 46 World Politics 1 (1993).
22

See Dennis M. Simon, Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability, 51 J. Politics 286, 286-87
(1989) (“According to this perspective, electoral accountability is imposed on a systemic or national basis through
voting which is presidency-centered, retrospective, and result-based.”).
23
See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003) (developing models
of representative democracy). See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); AMARTYA
SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES (1983).
24

See Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems and Electoral Institutions: The 17th
Amendment and Representation in the Senate (unpublished manuscript 1996) (surveying agency problems in the
selection of government officials and the sanctioning of government officials).
25

See Douglas R. Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Representatives?, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED (5th ed, Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, eds. 1993); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
26

ANGUS CAMPBELL, ET AL. THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960) (documenting widespread lack of information
and opinions about politics).
27

See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (Cambridge 1992) (public opinion
created by officials and elites rather than preexisting in voters); WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM
(1982).
28

See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (Cambridge 2003) (modeling relationship
between government structures, interest groups, and political behavior).

2008

The Unbundled Executive

6

Chief among these is that the relationships between voters and politicians be they
executives or legislators are riddled with agency problems.29 Because politicians will often have
expertise that voters lack, politicians will have a significant degree of discretion. If voter
information is worse than politician information, voters will often not be able to tell whether a
policy that diverges from their own preferences diverges for good reasons (politician expertise)
or bad reasons (divergent legislative preferences or self-interest). The agenda control exercised
by elected officials may also allow politicians to enact policy that systematically diverges from
voter preferences.30 So long as representatives propose a new policy that is far from voter
preferences but less far than the status quo ante, voters may not be able to obtain desired policy
outcomes. Elections help mange or mitigate these agency problems because elections provide a
mechanism for voters both to select representatives that will take desirable actions,31 and
sanction politicians who fail to enact policy consistent with voter preferences.32
With respect to a democratic control of a national executive, elections are clearly an
imperfect control mechanism. No employment schemes that we know of try to control workers
by using a single hire-fire decision made every four years. Presidential elections every two years
would provide greater public accountability than elections every four, but would also generate
greater participation costs on the public. The extent of slack—divergence between public
preferences and political decisions or behavior—varies as a function of electoral institutions. Our
conceptual model holds constant electoral frequency, and instead restructures the executive
authority that is regulated by elections. Specifically, we suggest there are many benefits from
unbundling executive authority.33
What would an unbundled executive look like? The basic idea is as follows. Suppose in a
given jurisdiction there are j policy dimensions. On any given dimension, the executive can
choose either a special interest-friendly policy or a voter-friendly policy. A majority of voters
prefers the voter-friendly policy on each dimension. However, there is an interest group in each
29

ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D.
THEY NEED TO KNOW? 79 (Cambridge).

MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT

30

See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the
Status Quo, 33 Pub. Choice 27 (1978).
31

James Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus
Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
SUSAN STOKES, AND BERNARD MANIN, EDS. 1999).
32

Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarjan Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency Problems, 110 J. ECON THEORY
1318 (1998); Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan Sundaram, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated
Elections Model, in POLITICAL ECONOMY: INSTITUTIONS, COMPETITION, AND REPRESENTATION (Barnett, Hnich &
Schofield, eds 1993); John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE (1986);
Robert Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 42 (1973).
33

See Timothy Besley and John Coate, Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence, 1 J.
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1176 (2003); Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives
(unpublished manuscript 2000); Our own revisions and applications are presented in Christopher R. Berry & Jacob
E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions (unpublished manuscript 2007). For other work on
elected versus appointed officials, see Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (unpublished manuscript
2007); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When it Runs for
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 (2004).
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domain that prefers the special-interest policy, and the group will provide a private benefit to the
executive if the special interest’s preferred policy is enacted. This benefit may be a campaign
contribution that the executive can use to improve her lot at election time or a bribe that can be
used for private consumption. The executive would like to receive the side payments from the
interest groups, but only if doing so will not cost her the next election.
Suppose there is only one single elected executive who has responsibility for all j policy
dimensions. This is the “general purpose” executive familiar in the U.S. context; the single
executive will be ascribed all the blame and all the credit for executive policy decisions, and
rightly so. But because elections require voters to make a single elect-reject decision, the
crudeness of the electoral sanction is a weak way for voters to control the single executive on
any particular policy dimension. Voters must make a decision on a bundle of policy dimensions.
As a result, the official can enact special interest-friendly policies in some dimensions, as long as
she enacts voter-friendly policies on a sufficient number of dimensions to secure reelection. For
general purpose executives, elections will not completely mitigate agency problems, though
naturally they produce more policies that are close to majority voter preferences than would an
electoral system without elections.
Contrast the general purpose (bundled) executive with the possibility of “special
purpose” executives. Suppose there are only three important policy dimensions about which the
public cares. Rather than elect one executive to oversee all of them, the jurisdiction elects three
executives each of whom is responsible only for one of the policies. When one executive has
exclusive responsibility for providing only a single policy, e.g., water or sanitation or defense,
citizens need not aggregate judgments across multiple policy issues at election time. A vote for
or against the special purpose executive summarizes voter preferences on a single policy
dimension. An executive who enacts an interest-group-friendly policy in her single domain will
not be able to placate voters with voter-friendly policies on other issues. Specialized elected
executives therefore make elections more effective mechanisms for controlling officials; the
greater the unbundling, the greater the mitigation of agency problems in government.34 In short,
an unbundled executive is more democratically accountable than a single executive.
34

See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000). The logic of issue unbundling
has been applied sporadically in other settings. For example, one paper provides empirical support for the issue
unbundling argument by contrasting elected and appointed utility regulators. Besley & Coate, supra note 33. Using
panel data for US states, they find that elected regulators systematically enact more consumer-friendly policies than
appointed regulators. The unbundling intuition has also been used to explain one of the benefits of citizen initiatives.
See John G. Matsusaka, John G, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103 J. POL.
ECON. 587 (1995). For an extension of the implications of the direct democracy argument for the executive branch,
see John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch (unpublished manuscript 2004). By
unbundling a single issue from a legislative logroll—be it budgetary or policy—voters are thought to be able to
better ensure outcomes close to majoritarian preferences for the given policy dimension. Id. This same theme is at
play in the scattered assortment of justifications given for single-subject limitations in state constitutions, for
instance in Colorado and Florida. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Chaos, Direct Democracy, and the Single
Subject Rule (unpublished manuscript 2006); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process,
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. LEGISLATION
103 (2001). The single-subject limitation is supposed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored only by a
minority of politicians or voters are enacted together. Michael Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006). The logic of unbundling then is general, and we are agnostic about whether
unbundling in any particular instance is good or bad. In the single-subject context, logrolls could easily be welfare
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If so, why not design an executive structure with hundreds of directly elected executives?
There is a theoretical limit to the unbundling benefits that can be achieved by executive
unbundling because there are costs produced by increasing the number of elected executives.35
Consider two variants: monitoring costs and coordination costs. The addition of new elected
executives produces an increase in monitoring costs. Each additional officer added to the ballot
requires additional work on the part of voters. As the number of elected executives grows, the
costs to citizens of monitoring a legion of public officials may outweigh any marginal benefits
associated with issue unbundling.
Although monitoring costs might entail many issues, we focus on two components. The
first is a function of the number of issues for which an executive provides policy. A voter has to
determine whether each policy has been set at the level she prefers. This first component is a
function of the number of aggregate policy dimensions and (importantly) largely independent
from the number of elected executives. The second is a function of the number of elected
executives rather than the number of overall issues. For each executive, the citizen must be able
to identify the incumbent and assess her responsibility for a particular service or services.
Consider a random voter at the polls. On the ballot, she sees a list of offices, and for each
office a list of names. The ballot often does not identify the incumbent, and in most cases it does
not even list a political party affiliation.36 At a minimum, a voter must be able to identify the
incumbent for each office and match the incumbent to an assessment of the service(s) performed
by the office in question. Where there is only one general purpose executive, all services can be
attributed to one official. The voter needs only to know which candidate is the incumbent and to
form an overall assessment of the incumbent’s performance. Where there are many offices, the
task becomes considerably more challenging. In practice, it is not at all unusual to find two
dozen or more elected offices on a local government ballot. We use the term monitoring costs to
denote the total effort required to evaluate all services in a jurisdiction and match them to the
relevant incumbent officials.
In addition to monitoring costs, unbundling executive authority also produces
coordination costs. When two similar policies are produced by different executive authorities
without coordination, these policies might conflict or at least not work as well in tandem as
might be the case if the policies were produced by a unified policymaker. For policies that are
jointly produced by two specialized elected offices, these coordination costs will be most severe.
Some unbundling of executive authority should reduce slack, making policy more
democratic. Too much unbundling could actually increase slack, allowing politicians to
implement personal rather than public preferences. As monitoring costs increase, each elected
executive might receive less scrutiny from voters. Officials governing specialized domains could

enhancing so long as the value to the minority receiving benefits along each dimension is high enough. The point is
merely that the idea of unbundling has been usefully applied in a handful of other legal and policy contexts.
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then adopt special interest-friendly policies without suffering electoral reprisals. Similarly, for
certain subsets of policies, coordination costs could swamp democratic benefits.
When executive authority is unbundled and given solely to a specialized executive
directly elected by the public, this is the purest form of executive unbundling. The general
purpose executive now has responsibility for j-1 policy dimensions and the special purpose
official responsibility for one. There are, however, intermediate variants, involving different
appointments and removals schemes which produce more complicated tradeoffs.
Consider first a straightforward theoretical example. Suppose a specialized environment
executive is appointed by a general purpose executive. Environmental issues are partially
unbundled in the sense that one official exists who primarily oversees environmental policy.
However, because the choice of who to appoint and how to regulate, and when to remove is still
maintained by the general purpose executive, environmental issues are not perfectly unbundled.
Part of what makes the unbundled executive intuition attractive is that there is one executive with
exclusive authority to make decisions about one policy dimension. To the extent that the
authority to make final decisions is somewhat shared, the crispness of the pure scheme wanes.
The general purpose executive can obviously be disciplined by voters if, for example, she
selects a bad environment executive. But the general purpose executive would still be able to
appoint poor specialized executives on some dimensions, so long as policy was good enough on
a majority of dimensions. If the environment executive is directly elected, the reelection vote
only need summarize approval on one policy dimension. When executive authority is parceled
out to officials that are not directly elected then, things are significantly more unwieldy. Net
effects depend on whether the authority is exclusive or overlapping and whether the appointment
is vested entirely in the discretion of one institution or several.
Now consider the unwieldy empirical reality. The range of mechanisms for selecting
executive officials in the states is quite extensive.37 When appointment power is given to the
governor, sometimes no approval from another political institution is needed; sometimes the
senate must approve; sometimes both houses of the legislature must approve; sometimes either
house can approve; sometimes a board or council must approve; sometimes only a legislative
committee must do so. For certain offices, an agency head appoints without approval from
another institution; sometimes the governor must approve; sometimes the senate or a legislative
institution must do so. For other offices, a board or council appoints, subject to approval by the
governor and/or the senate. For still other offices, the legislature appoints administrative
officials.
These different appointment schemes also produce different degrees of unbundling and
therefore of public control over policy. If direct election of a special purpose executive official
results in the most unbundling, appointment of an official by one institution, be it the governor,
the legislature, or a state board or commission with the consent of another institution, where
policy jurisdiction is shared constitutes the least unbundling. In this case, not only can the
appointed official not be directly sanctioned by the public, but it is not clear which institution
should be punished for a bad appointment. Standard models of appointments emphasize that both
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the nominating and the consenting institution will affect the selection and approval of officers.38
Without the ability to blame or credit a single elected official, public sanctions will be less
effective. Moreover, when the appointed official shares authority for policy implementation with
other officials or institutions, it is difficult to know who to blame for failure or credit for success.
Appointment of executive officials with overlapping jurisdiction may be desirable for other
reasons, but there is little in the way of unbundling benefits. Whereas unbundling by independent
election clarifies which public officials can be held responsible for which public policies, the
hybrid appointment schemes muddle responsibility. Indirect appointment schemes are less
effective for controlling moral hazard in politics. 39 Between these two extreme positions fall
officials who are appointed by a single elected official (usually the governor) with exclusive
policy authority (more unbundling) and officials who are appointed with the consent of multiple
institutions with exclusive policy authority (less unbundling).
Democratic accountability or responsiveness is only one design consideration among
many. However, it is a particularly prominent one in constitutional design. On this dimension of
comparison, the analysis suggests that the unbundled executive outperforms the single executive.
The unbundled executive produces greater accountability in the executive than the single
completely bundled executive. We turn to other design considerations momentarily; however, we
pause briefly to show that the unbundled executive is not merely a construct of scholarly
imagination. Variants of unbundled executive regimes do exist in practice.
B. The Unbundled Executive in Practice
The Federal government does not rely on an unbundled executive structure, but state and
local governments certainly do.40 Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm
rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United
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States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would
otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are
directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still,
they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the
unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy
in the general purpose executive. Still, as executive authority is even partially unbundled, and
primary responsibility for specific policy domains is given to a directly elected official, policy
outcomes should move closer to public preferences along that dimension. Both the general
purpose and the special purpose executives should be more responsive to public preferences.
To give a sense of the institutional variation which we are describing, Table 1 presents
aggregate measures from the Census of Government, revealing that there were nearly 19,000
elected officials in state governments as of 1992. Of these, members of state legislatures
represented roughly 7,500 and members of other elected state boards accounted for another
1,300. The majority of state officials fell into the other category, comprising those individual
elected offices outside any board or legislative body. The bulk of these are unbundled executives.
Interestingly, the number of these independent elected officials grew spectacularly from
1967 to 1992, more than doubling from 4,200 to over 10,000. In comparison to the national
government, it is perhaps startling that there are more elected state officials outside the state
legislature than within it. This trend is new, emerging only within the past 40 years. Moreover,
the variation in executive unbundling across states is, if anything, even more dramatic than the
changes over time, as evidenced in Tables 2 and 3. There are only 80 state elected officials in
Delaware, while there are 1,200 in Pennsylvania. As of 1992, New Jersey had only one elected
official outside the state legislature (that is, the governor), whereas four other states—Texas,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida—each had over 600 non-legislative elected officials.
Turning to the specific executive offices, Table 4 shows that the governor is the only
position that is elected in every state. The attorney general is elected in 43, while the treasurer
and secretary of state are each elected in 38 states, as of 2002. Beyond these familiar offices, a
number of more obscure executive positions are elected in a handful of states. For instance,
utility regulators, education commissioners, and comptrollers are elected in less than half the
states, while the adjutant general is elected in only one. Comparing the figures for 1977 and
2002, we see the emergence of several new elected executive offices within the past quarter
century. Banking regulators, election administrators, finance offices, and community affairs
representatives all joined the ranks of state elected officials for the first time during this period.
Individual states show substantial differences in the extent of electoral unbundling of the
executive branch (Table 5). Of the 22 executive offices that were elected in at least one state,
there is no single state in which more than half of these different offices are elected. Maine, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey stand out as the only states in which the governor is the sole elected
executive officer. At the other extreme, 5 states—Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, South Carolina,
and Washington—each hold elections for 11 different executive offices. The average number of
elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002, up from 6 in 1977. All told then, state and
local governments unbundle executive authority to a significant degree, at least when compared
to the complete bundling that occurs in the Federal government.
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Elsewhere, we have estimated the impact of different degrees of executive unbundling on
public policy.41 Using various measures of unbundling, different estimation techniques, and
different data sources, the extent of unbundling consistently produces differences in policy
outcomes. This is true not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but also within a political
jurisdiction over time. Some unbundling produces outcomes closer to public preferences and too
much unbundling produces more slack. The result holds not only for state government, but also
for local government structures. This simple empirical result has far-reaching implications for
institutional design and constitutional theory.42
II. EXECUTIVE DESIGN PRINCIPLES & PROBLEMS
A. Background
Our model of an unbundled executive is closely related to two debates in constitutional
theory, one active and one dormant. Rather than analyze the costs and benefits of the unbundled
executive in isolation, we rely on these disputes as lens through which to view the unbundled
executive model.
The dormant dispute is whether there should be a single or plural executive. These
executive numerosity questions are dormant with good reason. The U.S. Constitution clearly
resolves it in favor of the single executive. In other times and places, this question has been
resolved otherwise, and our work suggests the single executive position is not the only tenable
one. Elsewhere there is far more variation in the way that executive authority is structured. In
ancient Rome, there was a dual magistracy.43 Andorra is technically structured as a duumvirate,
ruled by two co-princes.44 These arrangements are obviously somewhat different from the pure
version of an unbundled executive, but comparative contexts do show far more variation.
The second more active dispute is whether the single executive should have strong or
weak hierarchical (vertical) control over the execution or administration of law. Does and should
the Constitution establish strong vertical or hierarchical control by the President over all officials
that implement federal law? Properly cabined, this is or should be the key question in the unitary
executive debate.
A critical additional question only becomes intelligible if the numerosity question is
resolved in favor of multiple executives. Given multiple executives, should their authority be
concurrent, partially overlapping, or exclusive vis-à-vis each other. The single versus plural
debate generally assumes that multiple executives must exercise overlapping authority, and for
this reason conclude the arrangement produces ineffective or inefficient government. This
assumption is defensible on historical grounds because most plural executives were councils, the
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members of which shared concurrent authority. Once the assumption of overlapping authority is
relaxed, however, the force of many standard critiques of plural executive systems wanes.
One reason the unbundled executive appears startling is that these separate analytic
questions have become conflated. If the single-plural question has been resolved in favor of one
executive, the unbundling question seems nonsensical. If executive authority can only be
overlapping, then a plural executive looks ineffective. If one favors a strong unitary executive,
any plural system first looks unappealing because authority that is not centralized tends to be
weak. Thus, in this section, we try to keep these dimensions of potential institutional choice
distinct, matching existing critiques and intuitions to the relevant dimension.
We emphasize two claims throughout this section. First, any general criticism of plural or
unbundled executives must somewhat reconcile dire predictions about government failure that
would derive from a plural executive and the reality of successful state governments in the
United States. It is possible that state and local governments would be even better without
unbundled authority, but it is uncharitable in the extreme to describe all unbundled state
governments as completely dysfunctional. Second, there is an essential difference between
unbundled authority and concurrent authority as we will show. The most prominent critiques of
the plural executive model target schemes in which several executives act in consort with
overlapping authority. Such schemes may well produce government dysfunction,
unaccountability, or trend towards tyranny, but the unbundled executive does not.
B. Executives, Single and Plural
The reasons that a plural executive regime was rejected and a single executive regime
embraced are many. But there are only a handful of recurrent themes that truly dominate this
debate. First and foremost is a suggestion that single executives are democratically accountable;
plural executives are not. As we have now repeatedly suggested, this is simply a mistake
deriving from confusion about what features of plural executives are necessary and which are
merely common. Single executives are also said to be better at providing uniformity and
coordination in the implementation of law.45 Single executives are often to be required by the
inherent nature of policy issues that constitute important cores of executive authority, like war
and trade. A common suggestion in the convention era debates was that only a single executive
could provide the energy strength, and agility necessary to sustain the fledgling executive
branch; another, that something inherent in the notion of separation of powers requires a single
executive.46 Each of these ideas has an intuitive superficial appeal, but each is also wrong, or at
least not quite right. Along virtually all of these dimensions the unbundled executive performs as
well or better than the single executive. When considered as a whole, rather than dimension by
dimension, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger. Our discussion no doubt loses
much of the nuance in these complex debates. Nonetheless, we attempt to address the most
common collection of relevant ideas and arguments related to numerosity and unitariness.
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1. Accountability
The most frequent argument in favor of a single and strong executive has to do with
democratic accountability. The President is the only elected official with a truly national
constituency. Multiple executives would create confusion and ambiguity about which officials
were responsible for what policy. The same claim is made with respect to independent agencies
in the unitary executive debate. The inability to impose electoral sanctions would undermine the
democratic process, debilitating the ability of voters to select and discipline politicians, or so the
argument goes. Hamilton articulated this idea with some force:
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as
much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy
responsibility. . . . It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine
on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity,
and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the
real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who
may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the
whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to
whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.47
Whether or not this passage supports the strong unitary executive vision as it is sometimes taken
to do,48 it clearly favors a single rather than plural executive. The underling ideas are intuitive
and the rhetoric powerful, but in our view, the central claim is simply incorrect. It assumes a
plural executive must entail overlapping or concurrent authority rather than exclusive authority.
When multiple parties share authority, it may in fact be difficult to assign blame or credit. But as
noted above, the single versus plural executive dimension is conceptually distinct from the
overlapping versus exclusive jurisdiction dimension.49 In theory at least, it is straightforward to
construct a plural executive with exclusive authority or jurisdiction. Our model of the unbundled
executive does just that.
True, as a historical matter, the multiple executive structures of which we are aware
usually did entail overlapping authority, and therefore, this slippage is understandable. It is also
true that when authority for a policy is given to many actors, none of whom is clearly in control,
it will be difficult for voters to blame any single official and impose electoral sanctions
accordingly. This idea from No. 70 was echoed elsewhere in the convention era debates, along
with familiar claims about shirking and free riding in multi-member bodies. “We well know
what numerous executives are. We know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in
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them.”50 These arguments were offered again and again against those who favored executive
councils. Indeed, this is part of the difficulty with using elections to sanction officials in the
legislative branch: it is a multi-member body and when multi-member bodies fail, parsing
responsibility is difficult.
The simple difference between the unbundled executive on the one hand, and the typical
plural executive critiqued by political and legal theorists on the other, is that the former involves
(more or less) exclusive authority of the individual executives, while the latter entails (more or
less) overlapping authority. The unbundled executive would involve parceling it out to wellidentified and directly elected officials, which facilitates rather than undermines the democratic
process—clarifying authority rather than ambiguating it. To reiterate an earlier point, a vote for
or against a Presidential candidate is remarkably crude; it is a weighted average of voter approval
of dozens if not hundreds of policy dimensions. A vote for or against an elected Secretary of
Education is less so. Directly electing one official to oversee one policy does not obviously
create more democratic slack than electing one official to oversee hundreds of policies. So long
as unbundling is coupled with exclusive authority within a jurisdiction, the unbundled executive
is preferable on accountability grounds.
2. Functional Duties & Single Executives
Even if the unbundled executive serves state and local governments well, maybe the
characteristics of the national presidency differ in critical ways. For example, one frequent
assertion is that functional characteristics of the national presidency demand that one single
individual have all executive authority. Governors, for example, do not manage armed conflicts
or foreign policy; they do not negotiate with other sovereign states. When war and peace are at
stake, it is especially important that the country speak with one voice capable of quick and
decisive action. In the same way that spreading across multiple institutions slows the pace of
action when a rapid response is required,51 dispersing this authority among multiple executives
does so as well. Controlling militaries and dealing with war requires a single strong executive.52
To start with, we note a minor historical point. In the 1700s, the single versus plural
executive issue was distinct from whether the executive should have authority to make war or
peace (exclusively or concurrently). Pickney, for example, favored a single vigorous executive,
but did not want the executive power to entail authority to make war and peace.53 A single
executive did not necessarily imply the power to make wars; the power to make war did not
necessarily prohibit a plural executive. Others favored an independent but plural executive.54
50
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These questions are related, of course, but one does not dictate the other, either as a matter of
theory or history.
Nonetheless, suppose we assume foreign relations as a policy issue does require that a
single individual exercise ultimate control, and that being commander in chief is similar in this
respect. Nothing in this view implies that a single executive should have control over all
executive authority. It means only that each individual policy of this sort should be controlled by
one executive official. The claims about rapid response or speaking with one voice—even if
correct—mean only one executive officer should have exclusive policy jurisdiction in the
relevant domain; they support a single executive within a policy dimension, but not necessarily
across policy dimensions.
The critical question from the unbundled executive perspective is whether one single
individual should have authority over this entire set of executive policies. To give a purely
hypothetical example, it is easy to imagine a case in which voters might wish to remove, say, the
Secretary of Defense over the conduct of a failed war without at the same time replacing the
President. When the two offices are bundled together under a unitary executive, voters must
make a single elect-reject decision in the presidential election. If the Secretary of Defense were
directly elected, voters could express displeasure over the war without throwing out a President
who was succeeding on many other dimensions. This confusion about the relationship between
numerosity and exclusivity in government authority are common; the unbundled executive helps
clarify matters, or so we hope.
3. Energy
Energy is another important principle used to support both the single executive and later
the unitary executive.55 Many of the framers were explicitly concerned with designing a national
executive with sufficient energy, fearing a national government that was too weak would
crumble. In Federalist No. 37, for example, Madison argued that “[e]nergy in Government is
essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary
execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good Government.”56 Hamilton
went further:
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the
protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations,
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.”57
The trouble with this view is that there is slippage between the claim that one individual with
control over one policy will be optimally energetic and the conclusion that one individual with
control over all relevant policies will be optimally energetic. We are aware of no especially
compelling reason that a single executive with authority over j policy dimensions would be more
55
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energetic—in the parlance of the founders—than k executives each of whom has exclusive
responsibility for one dimension. If the claim were correct, then legions of state and local
governments are “suboptimal” on the energy dimension. Perhaps so, but the extent of state and
local government failure is not particularly high. If the U.S. states constitute fifty data points of
government continuity and the national government one, it seems odd to conclude that the fifty
have insufficiently energetic governments, and the one does not.
More plausible is that there is something akin to economies of scale in executive
authority, which makes control of j policy dimensions by one executive more efficient than
control by k executives. If so, then it is suboptimal to entirely unbundle executive authority, but
we have already said as much above. Moreover, just as the corner solution of complete
unbundling is unlikely to be optimal, so too is the opposite corner solution of no unbundling.
More likely, at least in our view, is that the relevant economies of scale suggest that some
executive unbundling is better than none or all.
4. Balance of Powers
If energy alone does not justify a single executive, perhaps the background separation of
powers in the constitutional structure does indirectly. In order for each branch to guard against
infractions by the others, maybe a single executive is required. One idea on this front is
historical: because of the inherent weakness of the President and the relative strength of the
legislature during the founding era, institutional features needed to be calibrated to ensure a
balance between the two. For example, bicameralism was necessary to weaken the legislative
branch and a strong single and unitary executive was needed to strengthen the President to create
rough parity.58
The problems with this view are extensive. A first mistake is conceptual, equating
strength with a lack of numerosity. Three executives who cannot agree are surely weaker than
one executive, but three executives of similar mind, acting in consort, are not obviously so. If
anything, they would seem as strong as or stronger than one executive. Alternatively, claiming
the founders worked ardently to strengthen the executive borders on disingenuous. Some sought
a strong executive and favored a single executive for that reason; others were concerned that a
single executive naturally trends towards monarchy, a result to be avoided.59 Indeed, the ideas
seem an odd overlay to inter-branch relations in the 1700s. The President had comparatively
narrow authority and resources: granting one President strong hierarchical control over virtually
nothing seems a peculiar corrective to concerns about a too-powerful Congress.
Alternatively, perhaps the relevant claim is that a single executive is necessary to protect
against incursions by an aggressive legislature. Balance of powers would be one criterion here,
but not the only one. The real question is how well a given executive structure would be able to
58
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patrol and protect the borders of its authority. The trouble for the single executive view is that
particularly good reason to suspect a single executive would more aggressively protect her
purview over j policy dimensions, than would k executives each of whom has responsibility for a
single policy dimension. If anything, unbundling authority in this way might create stronger
incentives for protecting turf because the proportional losses to a given executive would be
greater from Congressional incursion. In general form, the single executive view suggests
grounds would be better patrolled by one guard than a dozen simply because the average energy
exerted would be lower in the plural setting; the relevant criterion of course is the aggregate
energy and it would be altogether surprising if plurals did not do better on this front than one.
5. Uniformity
What of other values that a single executive is supposed to serve? “A strong unitary
executive can promote important values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the
execution of laws, and to whatever extent these were the framers’ values, they are certainly now
ours.”60 We have already suggested that the unbundled executive is preferable on accountability
grounds, but what about coordination and uniformity in a world of unbundled executive
authority?
Properly cabined, the legal value of uniformity concerns the similar application of one
legal principle in many different settings. That is, uniformity is about consistent application of
law within a policy dimension. Serving the interests of uniformity is sometimes said to require a
single executive, a unitary executive, or both. A single executive without unitary hierarchical
control might not be able ensure that different subordinates always apply the law in identical or
at least similar ways. In the same way, multiple executives might obviously apply or implement
the same law in different ways in different contexts or to different people. In either case,
uniformity would be undermined and faith in the rule of law sacrificed.
Again however, the assumption of overlapping authority obfuscates matters. The
unbundled executive framework starts with the premise that policy responsibility can be taken
away from a general purpose executive and given to a special purpose elected official. No doubt
this is something of an abstraction, but it is important to distinguish principled objections from
practical objections. If policy can be distributed in this way, then uniformity is no longer an
objection. Multiple executives with concurrent jurisdiction might produce a lack of uniformity,
but multiple executives with exclusive jurisdiction would not—or at least would do so no more
or no less than a single executive.
In point of fact, there is likely to be even greater uniformity in the unbundled executive
scheme. Why? In the single bundled executive structure, there is ultimately one person who must
ensure the uniform implementation of federal law across dozens or even hundreds of different
policy domains. The best case scenario is that this is enormously difficult and costly; the worst
case scenario is that it borders on impossible. In the unbundled executive scheme, one executive
must ensure the uniform implementation and application of federal law in a single domain. This
is hard as well, but it is an order of magnitude less difficult than in the bundled regime.
Moreover, the residual general purpose executive who must ensure uniformity in many policy
domains (in the partially unbundled world) must now do so for a subset of the total set of policy
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domains. The costs of doing so may still be substantial, but they are strictly lower than those
faced by the general executive in the bundled regime. General purpose executives must by their
nature focus on an expansive list of policies; specialized purpose executives need focus on only
one. This is flip-side of the “blinders” or “tunnel-vision” problem that agencies with a single
mission sometimes have in regulatory policy.61 Importantly, institutional designers who care a
great deal about uniformity might well prefer strong unitary hierarchical control for each
executive within their domain, a point which we are agnostic about. Ensuring intra-policy
uniformity, however, does not require a single executive.
6. Coordination
The concern about coordination, in our view, is quite different from uniformity in that it
focuses on inter-policy effects rather than intra-policy effects as uniformity does. The simple
underlying claim is that a single strong executive will be better able to coordinate related policies
and make sensible tradeoffs across those policies. If coordination is the overriding principle of
government organization, then the unbundled executive is likely worse than a single strong
unitary executive. Although we are open to clever counterarguments, we will assume that a
single executive with responsibility for k policy dimensions will be better able to coordinate
across dimensions. If inter-policy coordination is more important than accountability, uniformity,
energy, or efficiency, then institutional designers should reject the unbundled executive. If
coordination is one value among many, then the calculus is far more complicated, and does not
obviously disfavor the unbundled model.
Although coordination is a laudable goal, it is also worth noting that Congress has
enacted, the President has signed, and the Supreme Court has upheld a series of institutional
arrangements that are arguably inconsistent with the strong unitary executive position. Although
these cases have generated enormous debate, current doctrine upholds as constitutional
independent prosecutors,62 and the insulation of agency heads that are not pure or core executive
officers from plenary Presidential control.63 The Constitution, as applied, has already sacrificed
the pure goal of coordination in the service of other competing principles.
We will leave the debate about whether this is desirable to others. Still, compared to the
current state of affairs, the unbundled executive is likely superior on inter-policy coordination
grounds. The ultimate principal—the public—would select and sanction each of the specialized
executives. This arrangement gives the public better mechanisms for ensuring inter-policy
coordination compared with a system in which the President appoints but cannot remove agency
heads. Thus, as a comparative matter, the unbundled executive might be preferable on
coordination grounds to the current state of affairs, even if a strong unitary executive with
plenary control of the administration would be a first-best alternative along this one dimension.
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C. Strong Unitarians & Unbundled Executives
The unitary executive fight is often miscast in politics and the media. In constitutional
law it has little to do with the breadth of Presidential authority. Although many constitutional
theorists have strong views about how broad executive authority is or should be, we abstract
away from this debate entirely. Whatever one’s view about the proper scope of executive
authority, there is always a subsequent question about how that authority should be optimally
structured. A constitution could establish a plural executive with broad authority or a unitary
executive with narrow authority. A constitution could unbundle executive authority irrespective
of whether the stock of executive authority is a lot or a little.
Properly understood, the unitary executive debate is simply about the extent of
hierarchical control over executive or administrative officers that the Constitution establishes.64
In the U.S. context virtually everyone favors a unitary executive of one sort or another.65 The key
distinction is between “strong” unitary executives and “weak” unitary executives.66 There are
many nuances in individual views within various camps, but strong unitary executive types tend
to believe that Congress cannot insulate administrative officers from Presidential control, for
example, by only allowing removal for cause. Weak unitary executives tend to believe that the
President must have plenary control over certain principal purely executive officers, but that
officers who exercise authority that is not purely executive can be insulated to a greater or lesser
extent.67
To over-simplify just a bit, there are two main types of justifications for a strong unitary
executive. The first is historical or originalist: because the constitutional structure would have
been understood at the time of the founding to create a strong unitary executive, that is the
meaning that the constitution should be given.68 The second is more or less consequentialist.69
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Because of other shifts in government behavior and social development, a strong unitary
executive is laudable because it would help support a desirable constitutional structure.70
As should be evident by now, there is much overlap between the justifications for a
unitary executive and justifications for a single executive. Therefore many of the normative
justifications for the strong unitary executive position are natural counter-points to our model of
an unbundled executive. Although we suspect that most strong unitary executives would oppose
the unbundled executive, in our view the positions are not conceptually inconsistent, at least
setting aside the originalist or historical justification. To the extent that one favors strong
hierarchical control of executive subordinates, it is possible to favor an unbundled executive in
which each executive exerts complete vertical control. Each unbundled executive could remove
subordinates at will, veto policy judgments, or even substitute his own judgment in lieu of the
subordinate officer’s.
We have said nothing about whether this strong form of vertical control is desirable or
not. If it is (according to some external theory of executive authority), one could favor a strong
unitary unbundled executive system. If not, one could favor a weak unitary unbundled executive
system. Executive authority would be unbundled, but independent agencies and officers would
still exist. The modest conceptual point is that the degree of vertical control of an executive over
subordinates is distinct from the existence or extent of unbundling in the executive. Moreover, if
we are correct that the unbundled executive better serves the underlying principles that unitary
executives claim as their own, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger.
There is a sense, however, in which the unbundled executive is at least in tension with the
unitary executive position. A dominant, if not the dominant pragmatic justification for a unitary
executive is that only a single executive with control over all implementation of federal law is
democratically accountable. Insofar as this is merely a claim that a single unitary executive is
more democratically accountable than a single executive combined with independent agencies, it
could—but need not—be right.71 Insofar as it is a statement that a single unitary is more
accountability than any divided or plural executive structure, we obviously disagree. The
partially unbundled executive should produce greater accountability than the single unitary
executive vision.
D. Weak Unitarians and Unbundling
To this point, we have suggested that unitary executive types should actually prefer (or at
least not despise) the unbundled executive regime because it performs as well or better along the
very dimensions that supposedly justify a single unitary executive. While the unitary executive
camp is vocal, it is probably wrong to describe it as a majority position, either in academia or
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politics. What of weak unitary executive types, who are willing to tolerate if not embrace
independent agencies and/or officers who the President cannot remove except for cause?72
Again, properly understood the unitary executive camp is mainly concerned with vertical
control and therefore one can favor the unbundled executive independent of one’s views on
unitary structure. Nonetheless, to the extent that weak unitary executives support many of the
same principles that strong unitary executives do, all that we have said above applies here as
well. What is different for weak unitary executives is support for a lack of complete presidential
control over some administrative officers. This position could mean (a) some agencies or officers
should be beyond the control of any executive or (b) some agencies or officers should be beyond
the control of the executive or one executive.
This ambiguity is not usually evidenced, because in the U.S. system, we only have one
President. But once the possibility of several executives is one the table, there is some vagueness
in the weak unitary executive position. For example, suppose one favors an independent
members of the Federal Election Commission or the National Labor Relations Board, where
independent means only that the President cannot remove a commissioner without cause. If one
likes independence because it insulates policy decisions from voters (by weakening presidential
control), then having a directly elected Labor Executive or Election Executive who makes those
policy decisions will look unattractive. Unbundling gives greater control to voters, which (by
assumption) is a state of affairs to be avoided. By the same token, if the role of an executive is
“selection” of independent board members or commissioners, this could be accomplished with
an unbundled executive regime as well. The directly elected Labor executive would appoint
NLRB members who would then only be removable for cause. This is an example of a hybrid
unbundling and insulation regime.73
We have resisted making any claims about the desirability of political insulation, but if,
according to some external theory of good governance, political insulation is desirable, the
unbundled executive regime is flexible enough to accomplish it. Moreover, the unbundled Labor
Executive is likely to have more policy-specific expertise and therefore also likely to select better
commissioners, which could in turn increase the average quality of decision-makers.
Alternatively, if one favors independent agencies in the current system because some policy
decisions should be made by actors with local policy expertise who are not subject to generalist
political pressure, then conceivably one might prefer unbundled executives without political
insulation. Such commissioners would be either directly elected by the public or more likely
selected by a directly elected executive, who could then remove them for any reason or no reason
at all, much like the at will employee. Again, the unbundled executive regime would seem to
serve those interests as well as or better than then independent officer compromise.
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E. Unbundling, Concentration, & Dispersion
Although advocates of a strong executive are many, there is also a storied tradition in
political theory and law that is suspicious of the concentration of authority in one institutional
actor like the President, or more apropos an even stronger executive like a dictator. Dispersing
authority among multiple institutions is generally thought to be one the key strengths of the U.S.
separation of powers system.74 By requiring multiple institutions or political actors to sign on to
controversial government actions, dispersing government authority allegedly protects citizens.
The dark side of dispersion, long appreciated, is that the benefits of efficiency and speed (and
perhaps expertise) are forgone.75 As a matter of institutional design, there is obviously a tradeoff
between these values; precisely what the optimal balance is will depend on time and place.76
Many debates about the structure of executive authority are cast in terms of the centralization of
authority. This is true of the federal United States context, but it is also true of the comparative
literature77 and some very early work on state government structure in the 1950’s and 1960’s.78
Political scientists and lawyers have long studied how different constitutional structures, for
example, presidential versus parliamentary systems, produce different political outcomes, like
competition and stability.79 More recently, economists have estimated the effect of different
constitutional structures on economic policy, development, taxing, or spending.80
What of these scholars who distrust the centralization of authority? How should they
receive the unbundled executive? Whether this group of scholars should favor the unbundled
executive depends on precisely what is to be accomplished by decentralizing authority. This is
not always fleshed out with sufficient clarity, but one camp seems to be concerned with the sum
of all power than is given to one executive or government official. Too much centralization, on
this view, really implies too much power in one place. For supporters of this position, our theory
has much to recommend it. By definition, the unbundled executive regime carves up general
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executive authority and gives exclusively to different executive officers. By definition, the
aggregate executive power held by any one individual in our regime is less than the aggregate
executive power held by any individual in the single executive regime. The unbundled executive
is as good as any other fragmentation scheme in this regard, and potentially much better.
An alternative understanding of executive fragmentation, however, is concerned not so
much with aggregate authority, but with the lack of veto-points that a single centralized
executive must negotiate. It is not that one executive can exercise power over a lot of things, but
that one executive can exercise power over the objection of any other government officials.
When these scholars advocate fragmentation, they are really advocating councils or
committees—multi-member decision-making bodies—the consent of all or most of which is
necessary for action. Although we think this is not the majority position in the fragmentation
literature, if one holds this view, the unbundled executive is not likely to be (much) more
attractive than the current regime. To see why recall that exclusive policy authority within a
domain is a critical element of the unbundled executive model. It is a lack of consent from other
executives that supports greater accountability in the model. That said, the unbundled executive
is no worse from this perspective than the current regime and to the extent that any background
concerns about the centralization of too much power in one place linger in the shadows, the
unbundled executive might still be preferred on those grounds.
We hope it is clear by now that the unbundled executive does both more and less than
avoiding the concentration of executive authority. It does less in the sense that an unbundled
executive could have extremely broad authority say to act in the field of national defense without
assent from other political institutions. The unbundled executive does more than simply disperse
authority because it enhances democratic control over both the specialized executive and the
generalized executive. It does not make it harder for unbundled executives to act, but it does
make it easier for the public to monitor and sanction those actions.
F. Selection Effects
We have focused almost exclusively on incentive effects: how does the unbundling
executive authority alter the behavior of executives? An equally important question, however, is
whether the unbundled executive would generate selection effects.81 Would an unbundled plural
executive scheme attract or select different candidates to executive positions and would any
changes be normatively attractive?82 The dynamics that generate such effects are likely to be
complex and we do not want to present a false sense of certainty. Nonetheless, some tentative
observations are warranted.
It is possible, but we think unlikely, that the unbundled executive would produce no
selection effects. In this world, all the unbundled executives would like essentially the same as
the single bundled executive looks. For this to occur there would have to be near perfect overlap
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in the characteristics that make for a good executive across all policy domains. That is, the same
attributes that would for a good Education Executive would have to make for a good War Powers
Executive. No doubt, there will be some overlap—for example the ability to inspire. But the
characteristics that make one a good war time leader are not necessarily those that make for a
good peace time leader.83 The greater the overlap across domains, the less the selection benefit of
the unbundled executive. If that is correct, then the unbundled executive regime would produce
some executives that have attributes quite different from the general purpose executive, which
means we need to know more about the direction of the effects to make a normative evaluation.
How would the unbundled executive regime attract a different population of potential
executive candidates to run for executive office? Suppose potential Presidential candidates are
attracted to the possibility of being the leader of the free world rather than one of a handful of
leaders of the free world. In that case perhaps the unbundled executive would drive some
candidates from executive elections. This is a possible effect, but if it exists it tends to support
rather than undermine our case.
First, it is not at all clear that having six unbundled executives would make the office(s)
significantly less attractive to qualified applicants. Those that run for President in the United
States are often former Senators, Representatives, and governors. If the potential candidates
came from Congress, the prospect of being one of many powerful national leaders was not a
sufficient disincentive to drive them from public life. If the candidate were a former governor,
recall that most state executives are already somewhat unbundled. If unbundling in the state
government context nonetheless attracted high quality candidates to public life, we are hard
pressed to see why unbundling in the national government context would not do so. Of course,
perhaps part of what makes serving in the U.S. Congress or state governorships attractive is the
possibility of moving on to higher office; maybe if the Presidency were unbundled even those
offices would be less attractive? This view borders on the absurd. The probability of winning the
Presidency is sufficiently small for any senator, congressman, or state governor, that adjusting
such incentives is not likely to have much effect.
It is often said that governors make good presidents because they have prior executive
experience. The unbundled executive regime would produce a larger pool of candidates with
some executive experience in national government; perhaps this would make presidential races
more competitive and drive ever stronger candidates. In countries where the chief government
executive is significantly weaker than the President is in the United States, it simply does not
appear that lower quality politicians serve. Surely Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were of
roughly similar caliber to William Clinton and Ronald Reagan. It is hard to see an obvious trend
as to intellect, strength, and leadership, as a function of Presidential versus Parliamentary
systems.
All that said, if the unbundled executive does attract a different pool of candidates to run
for office, it is hard to imagine that the new pool would be of systematically lower quality. To
make any headway on this problem, we need to know whether the unbundled executive reduces
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the probability of selecting the truly great executive (the top part the potential executive
distribution), reduces the probability of screening out the worst executives (eliminating the
bottom portion of the distribution), and raises or lowers the median or average executive elected.
The worst case scenario would be to design a system that screens out the best executives and
selects the worst.
The candidates who would be attracted to run for President in the bundled world, but
would no longer be in the unbundled world, are likely to be those for whom aggregate power is
most important: individuals for whom being the person in control of everything. Perhaps this
group makes for good Presidents, but it seems to have most in common with megalomaniacs. In
other countries, this would be a group of likely dictators. Making the election of aspiring
dictators less likely hardly seems a mark of shame for any executive regime.
What about the top of the distribution? Would the unbundled executive manage to select
the best candidates? No electoral system is perfect, but we suspect the unbundled executive
would perform better on this front than the bundled regime. Indeed, this is part of the beauty of
the unbundled executive regime. In a world with a single executive, voters must trade-off
desirable executive attributes on less important dimensions for desirable attributes on more
important dimensions. The unbundled regime requires fewer of these tradeoffs. Voters need not
find a single person who is both strong and wise and compassionate and so on; citizens can tailor
the importance of a single executive attribute to a single policy domain. Our hope is that this
would make for higher quality executives along each dimension. Each individual executive
would be a better fit for their policy area. Therefore, the average executive quality within a
domain would generally rise. For this not to increase average executive quality, it would have to
be the case that in some domains, the selected unbundled executive performs much worse than
the bundled executive. On balance, the net selection effects then would seem to be either quite
positive or negligible.
III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
The burden of persuasion for this paper is significant, but what if all we have said thus far
is correct and the unbundled executive would outperform the current bundled executive? Would
this revision to the constitutional order generate other collateral consequences that are clearly
undesirable? We think the answer to this question is yes and no. Adopting an unbundled
executive would produce collateral consequences. Many of these of these are desirable; others
are straightforward to remedy with relatively minor adjustments the constitutional structure. The
relevant thought experiment is to maintain the basic contours of the U.S. constitution and
compare the current perfectly bundled executive to a partially unbundled executive. No doubt
this adjustment raises numerous potential complications; we note several prominent ones herein.
A. Separation of Powers
Suppose one wanted to maintain the rest of the constitutional structure, while adjusting
article II to create an unbundled executive. What are the implications for separation of powers
concerns? If the concern is balance of powers, then so long as the scope or breadth of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers are held constant, the unbundled executive does not disrupt
whatever parity of powers does (or does not) exist in the current system. The executive might
have too much or too little power vis-à-vis Congress today, but the unbundled executive would
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not upset this balance. If the concern is avoiding encroachment, then the unbundled executive
might actually fare better. Elected executives with responsibility only for some policy
dimensions would be less likely (because less able) to trade legislative encroachments in one
policy area for executive gains in another. That is, the unbundled executive helps avoid
legislative encroachments achieved by bargain rather than by fiat.84 Many of the most prominent
recent separation of powers cases like Bowsher v. Synar85 or United States v. Chadha86 involve
issues of exactly this sort. Violations of separation of powers principles tend to occur with the
consent of two branches rather than unilateral incursion by one. If the unbundled executive
prevents even some of these, branch relations would be improved not worsened.
However, because the unbundled executive increases public control over executive
policy, the unbundled executive might be more constrained than the bundled executive. It seems
awkward to call this executive weaker instead of more accountable, but for the sake of argument
suppose this does makes the executive less powerful relative to the legislature. The unbundled
executive still does not produce legislative dominance.
The reason is that the extent of unbundling in the executive branch is not the only
dimension along which institutional arrangements can be adjusted. The unbundled executive
could easily be adjusted to preclude independent officers—that is to create stronger unitary
control that would enhance the power of various unbundled executives. Other alternatives might
also ratchet up executive power to easily compensate for any marginal reduction stemming from
unbundling. More important, the extent of executive power has grown exponentially since the
founding. Congress’ powers have grown, but clearly at a less rapid pace. If the founders’ intent
was to produce an initial balance or parity among the branches, surely it is the executive branch’s
power that is now out of whack. If the unbundled executive weakens the executive—although
again, we think it does not—it might actually bring the branches closer to parity, bringing the
balance of power closer to that originally contemplated and in the process enhancing the degree
of accountability in the executive branch.
B. Presentment
The unbundled executive also raises novel questions about other constitutional structures.
For example, article I section 7 requires bicameralism and presentment to enact a valid law.87
With multiple executives, who would sign? All the executives, none, one? Questions like these
are far from the path on which we started, and therefore our views are necessarily tentative.
However, several scenarios present themselves.
The most likely one would be for a Congress or an institutional actor like the House or
Senate parliamentarian to designate the executive with the relevant policy authority.
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Transportation legislation would be signed by the transportation executive. This could create the
opportunity for gaming, of course. Legislation could be framed as a transportation bill when in
fact it was a welfare bill. But these are standard problems within Congress as well. House and
Senate rules typically require that legislation be referred to the committee with the most relevant
jurisdiction.88 Historically some gaming has emerged, but for the most part, committees guard
their turf and bills are sent to the appropriate one. Loose norms have generally been sufficient to
prevent a breakdown of the rules. If the practice works reasonably well within Congress, there is
no reason to think it would work substantially worse across branches.
Even better would be to designate links between Congressional committees and special
unbundled executives ex ante. Then decisions about which committee to send a bill to would
produce an automatic decision about which executive to present the bill. Here too there could be
gamesmanship. Legislation with no possibility of being signed by the transportation executive
might be packaged as welfare legislation or vice versa. Although our intuition is that these
problems are not nearly as severe as others that plague the current state of affairs, our system
cannot avoid them entirely. Still, the unbundled executive entails a straightforward method of
disciplining such behavior. If the transportation executive signs welfare legislation, and if voters
care, it is easier to express displeasure with electoral sanctions in the unbundled executive world
than in the bundled executive world.
C. Logrolls
If unbundled executives could only sign legislation that is within their policy domain,
would that not eliminate the possibility of logrolls and omnibus legislation? Within a policy
domain, big legislative packages and logrolls would still be possible. Therefore, it seems likely
that the current practice of enacting big transportation bills every several years would continue;
such legislative packages do contain and would continue to contain plenty of logrolls and sidedeals, for better or for worse.89
Across policy domains, however, logrolls and omnibus legislation would be marginally
more difficult. This does not seem especially tragic and there are those that would applaud the
effect. Some logrolls however are welfare enhancing rather than wasteful. If inter-policy logrolls
are especially important according to some external theory of the good, then our system could be
adjusted to allow for them. Consider the following proposal: legislation covering two policy
domains must be presented to both the relevant executives. If both sign, the bill becomes law. If
neither signs, the legislature could override the veto with a supermajority vote of 2/3. If one
executive signs and the other does not, the legislature could override the single veto with a vote
of 3/5 (or some other lesser variant). Upon more serious consideration, these alternative regimes
might be good or bad, but the basic unbundled executive structure is flexible enough to
incorporate such changes or not as others prefer.
88
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See, e.g., Rule XVII, Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate.

The single-subject limitation is supposed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored only by a
minority of politicians or voters are enacted together. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the
Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on
Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38
HARV. J. LEGISLATION 103 (2001). Michael Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 803 (2006).
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D. Administrative Agencies
Although the executive has many important duties, managing administrative agencies and
regulatory policy is surely near the top of the list. Would the unbundled executive turn
administrative law and regulatory policy into a greater morass than it is already? We cannot say
that there would be no complications, but the most obvious trouble spots do not suggest a drastic
conceptual overhaul is necessary. Consider the dominant trend over the past several decades
towards more centralization and coordination of administrative agencies?90 Does this not suggest
we are swimming upstream in current even stronger than it first appears?
Note that one of the main justifications for increasing presidential control over agencies
has to do with democratic accountability.91 The president is directly elected by a national
constituency and agency heads are not. More control over agencies is better for democracy and
majoritarian preferences.92 But in the unbundled executive world each executive is directly
elected. There is no question that a directly elected Environment Executive is vastly more
democratically accountable than a single general purpose executive who oversees environmental
policy, along with hundreds of other policies, indirectly.
The other main justification given for greater centralized control of the bureaucracy is the
need for inter-risk or inter-policy tradeoffs—roughly speaking this is coordination concern. Just
as agencies with a single mission might pursue policy goals with blinders, so too might
unbundled executives.93 This lack of coordination could produce bad policy, although whether it
would typically produce policy that is better or worse on average seems an open question. The
simplest thing to say is that this is a real concern. The comparative advantage of the unbundled
executive, however, is that if the public is upset that some unbundled executive is pursuing
policy goals in too single-minded a way, then the public can vote that person out office. The
relevant unbundled executive has done a bad job; our structure provides a more effective way to
correct this problem than the current bundled structure.
Another alternative, which we have not seriously explored, would be to create an interpolicy tradeoff executive. Her policy domain would be inter-policy or inter-risk trades and
nothing else. A public frustrated with the tunnel vision of unbundled executives could either
discipline the executive behaving with tunnel vision or discipline the coordinating executive. In
effect, there could be an unbundled executive in charge of OIRA.94 The details of whether the
90

See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (documenting and
defending the extensive mechanisms by which Presidents exert control over administrative agencies). See also Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2007); Nicholas
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized Review of Regulation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. (2006).
91

But see Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003) (policies may be less majoritarian if old presidents can entrench
policies); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 758 (2001) (“many observers tend to
overestimate the significance of elections”).
92

But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy (unpublished manuscript

2007).
93

See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 11
(1993) (describing tunnel vision of specialist agencies).
94

See generally Nichols D. Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Review of Regulation, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1260 (2006).
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OIRA executive could veto or initiate new rules would have to be worked out, and we certainly
have not done so. However, we suspect one could do so in a sensible way that would not
debilitate either the administrative or the unbundled executive scheme.
The unbundled executive might even help solve some standard problems in
administrative law. For example, it has long been unclear how courts should deal with deference
to agencies with overlapping jurisdiction.95 Standard deference doctrines encourage courts to
defer to agencies, but when agencies share jurisdiction, courts must decide to which agency
deference is owed. In the current regime, this is a problem mainly because of overlapping
jurisdiction; it is easy to solve by creating agency jurisdiction that is exclusive rather than
shared.96 Similarly, the unbundled executive with exclusive policy authority actually solves
Chevron97 problems rather than creates them. There is a clear institutional actor—the unbundled
executive—to whom deference is owed or not, as standard deference doctrine dictates. By
trending towards, indeed by requiring, exclusive policy jurisdiction, the unbundled executive
would resolve some of these standard difficulties in administrative law doctrine.
E. Majoritarianism & Minoritarianism
We have suggested that a major advantage of the unbundled executive is greater
democratic responsiveness. We have urged that the structure enhances accountability. Another
line of attack on our argument would go as follows. Institutional design in a constitutional
democracy must balance many goals. Our constitution hardly cries out as a majoritarian
document. It is riddled with provisions that make it harder rather than easier to enact majoritarian
views. Protecting minority views is a competing value and it seems likely the unbundled
executive would produce too much accountability. We agree that the constitution does and
should balance the implementation of majoritarian views with the protection of minority
positions. If the existing constitution gets the mix exactly right, then any deviation towards more
or less accountability would be suboptimal, our proposal included.
However, there is a way in which the unbundled executive is, or could be, minoritarian,
albeit in a subtle way. Recall that as executive authority is unbundled, there is a corresponding
increase in monitoring costs. Suppose executive authority was unbundled such that there were 20
executives. When policy issues are unbundled by creating specialized executives with exclusive
with authority to make policy, the costs of participation for voters, e.g., gathering information
and voting, increase. A plausible inference is that as a result of increasing costs, participation is
lower in unbundled elections or that there is falloff such that voters vote for some but not all of
the unbundled executives on the ballot.98 A citizen will be is more likely to participate in the

95

See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT.

REV. 201.
96

Id. (arguing that Congress might intentionally generate exclusive or concurrent agency jurisdiction to
encourage or discourage agencies from regulating in new policy domains).
97

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a more elaborate
discussion, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007)
(discussing evolution of doctrine along with current issues faced by courts in applying deference rules).
98

There is empirical evidence to support the supposition that participation is selective in unbundled
elections. For example, Terry Moe has shown that teachers union members are up to 7 times more likely to
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executive election for the issue she cares about most. Citizens with high interest in the issue are
more likely to constitute a majority of voters for the given unbundled executive office, even if
they are a minority of all voters. This is essentially a selective participation effect, in which
minorities will control elections (and by extension outcomes) in the policy domains they care
most about. This result is not inevitable, but it is entirely plausible. Thus, while the general
theme of the unbundled executive is majoritarian, there are scenarios in which the unbundled
executive can protect and even enhance the ability of minorities to control politics.
F. Emergencies & Change
Much of our analysis is static in an important sense. It assumes that the relevant policies
dimensions can be identified ex ante and that a specific unbundled executive could be elected to
control those policies. In the real world, of course, things are not so straightforward. New policy
dimensions emerge; others fade away. When there is but one general purpose executive, these
shifts take care of themselves. When authority is unbundled, matters are more complicated. If the
bundled executive is better able to adapt or deal with emergencies, is this not a significant knock
on the unbundled executive?99
The ability of institutional structures to incorporate changing circumstances is important,
but there are two reasons the unbundled executive does not falter here. First, throughout our
discussion, we have emphasized the optimality of partial unbundling. At no point have we
suggested that perfect unbundling would be desirable. Thus, in our proposed regime, there is
always what might be termed a residual executive, the executive who has authority over all
issues that have not been unbundled. At the margin, this executive is more accountable than a
single general purpose executive.
When new policies or problems arise, the residual executive can address them just as the
existing totally bundled executive can do. This is true of gradual change, but it is also true of
more acute challenges like emergencies. The unbundled executive is not debilitated when
emergency strikes, or at least is no more debilitated than the bundled executive. The ability to
react to subtle or sudden changes in social circumstances is a value of both the current and
proposed regimes.
This response addresses what we take to be the more severe concern about the unbundled
executive. But what if new issues emerge that would best be unbundled or previously unbundled
regimes wane in importance? This problem has been faced by state and local governments for
many years. New elected offices are created with some frequency in the United States. There are
costs to doing so, but they are not particularly insurmountable. The structure of the executive
branch has changed enormously from the founding; today’s cabinet level officers are not the
same as those established early in our history. Although it is somewhat rarer to eliminate offices,
this also occurs at all levels of government. As society changes, political institutions do as well.

participate in school board elections than the average registered voter. See Terry Moe, Teachers Unions and School
Board Elections, in Beseiged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics (William Howell, ed., 2005).
99

Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Self Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631
(2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003).
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If old unbundled executives should be eliminated and new unbundled executives created, so be
it. These design problems are real, but they are third-order considerations. If the unbundled
executive is to be rejected, we doubt it will be on these grounds.
CONCLUSION
Our vision of the unbundled executive is preliminary, and perhaps it is a singularly
unlikely one as well. Still, unbundling executive authority seems to systematically produce
desirable effects on political institutions in representative democracies.100 Reform movements in
the states have long experimented with different structures of executive authority, and we
suggest constitutional design more generally might benefit from some of these lessons.101 At a
minimum, our work provides a counterweight to many wrong-head assumptions in modern
constitutional theory. Our work is mainly about constitutional possibilities rather than
constitutional realities. We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible
reading of the U.S. Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should.
And to the extent the current constitutional structure would allow for modest adjustments toward
the unbundled executive ideal, our work suggests such reforms would produce a government
structure more in keeping with the democratic ideals most commonly said to justify the single
unitary executive. The plural executive position has long been lampooned in constitutional
theory. The unbundled executive suggests it should be lampooned somewhat less.

100

But see William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006).
101

Thomas R. Dye, Executive Power and Public Policy in the States, 22 Western Pol. Q. 926 (1969).

Table 1. State Government Elected Officials, 1967-1992
1992

1987

1977

1967

18,828

18,134

15,294

13,038

Members of state legislatures

7,461

7,461

7,562

7,613

Members of other elected boards

1,331

1,300

1,229

1,230

10,036

9,373

6,503

4,195

Total

Other elected officials

Source: Census of Governments

2008

The Unbundled Executive

34

Table 2. Elected Offices by State, 1967 and 1992

Members of
legislatures

Total

Members of other
elected boards

Other elected
officials

1992

1967

1992

1967

1992

1967

1992

1967

Alabama

436

275

140

141

11

3

285

131

Alaska

255

415

60

60

139

341

56

14

Arizona

239

228

90

90

117

120

32

18

Arkansas

349

205

135

135

0

0

214

70

California

226

177

120

120

4

4

102

53

Colorado

280

214

100

100

16

11

164

103

Connecticut

333

352

187

213

0

0

146

139

80

71

62

53

12

12

6

6

Florida

934

354

160

165

0

3

774

186

Georgia

465

389

236

259

5

5

224

125

Hawaii

91

89

76

76

13

11

2

2

Idaho

171

141

126

105

0

0

45

36

Illinois

623

633

177

235

9

9

437

389

Indiana

506

386

150

150

0

0

356

236

Iowa

319

275

150

185

0

0

169

90

Kansas

343

240

165

165

10

0

168

75

Kentucky

565

275

138

138

3

3

424

134

Louisiana

629

404

144

144

155

92

330

168

Maine

210

186

186

185

15

0

9

1

Maryland

356

261

188

185

0

0

168

76

Massachusetts

225

303

200

280

8

17

17

6

Michigan

652

310

148

148

32

33

472

129

Minnesota

623

283

201

202

0

3

422

78

Mississippi

296

263

174

174

6

6

116

83

Missouri

994

553

197

197

448

236

349

120

Montana

201

203

150

159

0

3

51

41

Nebraska

201

114

49

49

21

17

131

48

Nevada

141

101

63

60

22

14

56

27

New Hampshire

430

430

424

424

5

0

1

6

New Jersey

121

90

120

89

0

0

1

1

New Mexico

220

173

112

112

13

13

95

48

New York

950

417

211

207

0

0

739

210

North Carolina

593

284

170

170

0

0

423

114

North Dakota

205

181

159

146

3

3

43

32

Ohio

231

202

132

132

21

23

78

47

Oklahoma

362

250

149

147

3

3

210

100

Delaware
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290

156

90

90

0

0

200

66

Pennsylvania

1,200

464

253

253

0

0

947

211

Rhode Island

155

155

150

150

0

0

5

5

South Carolina

195

198

170

174

0

0

25

24

South Dakota

155

147

105

110

3

3

47

34

Tennessee

321

257

132

132

3

3

186

122

Texas

815

534

181

181

18

24

616

329

Utah

200

140

104

97

9

5

87

38

Vermont

186

186

180

180

0

0

6

6

Virginia

143

143

140

140

0

0

3

3

Washington

537

452

147

148

207

210

183

94

West Virginia

205

175

134

134

0

0

71

41

Wisconsin

450

193

132

133

0

0

318

60

Wyoming

121

111

94

91

0

0

27

20
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Table 3. Elected Officials per Capita, by State, 1967 and 1992
State Government
Per 10,000
Population

Total Officials
State

1992

Local Government

1967

1992

1967

Per 10,000
Population

Total Officials
1992

1967

1992

1967

19.9

26

9.8

10.8

30.4

20.5

United States

18,828

13,038

0.76

0.67

493,830

508,720

Alabama

436

275

1.08

0.78

3,949

3,785

Alaska

255

415

4.64

15.26

1,674

557

Arizona

239

228

0.65

1.41

3,050

1,949

8.3

12.1

Arkansas

349

205

1.48

1.05

8,059

10,084

34.3

51.6

California

226

177

0.08

0.09

18,699

18,079

6.3

9.6

Colorado

280

214

0.85

1.08

8,325

6,478

25.3

32.8

Connecticut

333

352

1.01

1.22

8,814

10,509

26.8

36.6

Delaware

80

71

1.20

1.39

1,091

800

16.4

15.6

Florida

934

354

0.72

0.60

4,654

4,716

3.6

7.9

Georgia

465

389

0.72

0.87

6,064

6,837

9.4

15.3

Hawaii

91

89

0.82

1.24

92

95

0.8

1.3

Idaho

171

141

1.70

2.03

4,604

3,714

45.7

53.5

Illinois

623

633

0.55

0.59

41,713

35,721

36.5

33.3

Indiana

506

386

0.91

0.78

11,118

10,898

20.1

22.2

Iowa

319

275

1.15

1.00

16,160

20,726

58.2

75.4

Kansas

343

240

1.38

1.07

18,552

18,089

74.9

80.4

Kentucky

565

275

1.53

0.86

6,495

6,286

17.6

19.8

Louisiana

629

404

1.49

1.12

4,422

4,357

10.5

12.1

Maine

210

186

1.71

1.89

6,346

6,665

51.7

67.8

Maryland

356

261

0.74

0.72

1,767

1,680

3.7

4.7

Massachusetts

225

303

0.37

0.56

21,948

11,535

36.5

21.4

Michigan

652

310

0.70

0.37

18,052

23,074

19.4

27.6

Minnesota

623

283

1.42

0.79

18,247

26,007

41.9

72.7

Mississippi

296

263

1.15

1.13

4,458

4,498

17.4

19.3

Missouri

994

553

1.94

1.23

16,287

16,660

31.8

37

Montana

201

203

2.52

2.89

4,905

4,880

61.5

69.5

Nebraska

201

114

1.27

0.78

13,698

19,159

86.8

131.6

Nevada

141

101

1.17

2.22

1,077

797

9

17.6

New Hampshire

430

430

3.88

6.31

6,917

5,808

62.4

85.3

New Jersey

121

90

0.16

0.13

8,921

9,362

11.6

13.6

New Mexico

220

173

1.45

1.69

1,981

1,997

13.1

19.5

New York

950

417

0.53

0.23

24,982

24,091

13.9

13.2

North Carolina

593

284

0.89

0.57

5,227

5,220

7.9

10.4

North Dakota

205

181

3.21

2.78

15,277

16,145

239.1

248.4

Ohio

231

202

0.21

0.20

19,135

20,636

17.7

20

Oklahoma

362

250

1.15

1.02

8,627

9,210

27.5

37.5
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Oregon

290

156

1.02

0.80

7,543

7,529

26.6

38.5

Pennsylvania

1,200

464

1.01

0.40

29,276

33,890

24.6

29.3

Rhode Island

155

155

1.55

1.73

983

1,125

9.8

12.5

South Carolina

195

198

0.56

0.77

3,748

2,880

10.8

11.1

South Dakota

155

147

2.23

2.16

9,529

16,161

136.9

237

Tennessee

321

257

0.66

0.66

6,629

7,620

13.6

19.6

Texas

815

534

0.48

0.50

26,813

22,504

15.8

20.9

Utah

200

140

1.16

1.39

2,511

2,081

14.6

20.6

Vermont

186

186

3.30

4.59

8,348

7,059

148.3

174.3

Virginia

143

143

0.23

0.32

2,961

3,444

4.8

7.6

Washington

537

452

1.10

1.52

7,187

7,497

14.8

25.2

West Virginia

205

175

1.14

0.98

2,567

3,373

14.3

18.8

Wisconsin

450

193

0.92

0.46

17,379

20,165

35.5

48.5

Wyoming

121

111

2.67

3.37

2,621

2,288

57.7

69.5
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Table 4. Independently Elected State Offices

Office or Function

Number of States
where Elected
2002

1977

Governor

50

50

Lt. Governor

45

41

Attorney General

43

42

Treasurer

38

39

Secretary of State

38

37

Post-Audit

19

17

Comptroller

16

9

Education

15

20

Pre-Audit

15

12

Agriculture

12

11

Insurance

12

8

Public Utility Regulation

7

8

Community Affairs

6

0

Finance

5

0

Labor

4

4

Election Administration

4

0

Revenue

2

1

Banking

2

0

Adjutant General

1

1

Natural Resources

1

1

Social Services

1

0

Transportation

0

1

Source: Book of the States
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Table 5. Number of Independently Elected Executive Offices, by State, 2002 and 1977
State

2002

1977

Alabama

7

7

Alaska

3

2

Arizona

7

5

Arkansas

5

6

California

10

8

Colorado

5

5

Connecticut

6

7

Delaware

7

6

Florida

11

9

Georgia

10

5

Hawaii

2

2

Idaho

11

8

Illinois

8

8

Indiana

8

8

Iowa

7

7

Kansas

6

6

Kentucky

8

8

Louisiana

8

9

Maine

1

1

Maryland

4

4

Massachusetts

6

6

Michigan

4

4

Minnesota

6

5

Mississippi

9

12

Missouri

6

6

Montana

7

6

Nebraska

6

7

Nevada

6

7

New Hampshire

1

1

New Jersey

1

1

New Mexico

7

6

New York

7

3

North Carolina

10

10

North Dakota

11

12

Ohio

8

6

Oklahoma

8

10

Oregon

8

6

Pennsylvania

6

4
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Rhode Island

6

5

South Carolina

11

10

South Dakota

8

7

Tennessee

2

2

10

7

Utah

6

5

Vermont

7

6

Virginia

3

3

11

9

West Virginia

6

6

Wisconsin

6

5

Wyoming

9

4

6.72

6.04

Texas

Washington

Average

Source: Book of the States

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Jacob E. Gersen
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jgersen@uchicago.edu
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